CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

7 April 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

talks between Khrushchev and De Gaulle and the routine communiqué which followed them indicate that the Soviet premier failed to gain any commitments or concessions which would strengthen his position at the summit. In contrast to his extravagant appraisal of his recent Asian tour, Khrushchev, on his return to Moscow summed up the French visit as "fairly successful," admitting that on major issues French and Soviet views did not "fully coincide."

The German question re-

mained a fundamental point of disagreement

Khrushchev appears to have accepted the concept of protracted negotiations on Germany and Berlin in agreeing to a French proposal for a reference in the communiqué to "progressive settlement" of these questions on a basis "agreed on through negotiations." He folloved this up in his final conference on 2 April by confitting that the conclusion or appeace treaty and a Berlin Jution demand some time."

In his speech in Moscow on 4 April, however, Khrushchev implied that De Gaulle had made concessions to the Soviet position on a peace treaty. He claimed they had "established that there is a basis for working out an agreed position" on a number of most important questions, and he quoted the communiqué on Germany and Berlin as implicit support for this contention.

Khrushchev also claimed that his views on disarmament coincided with De Gaulle's.

Khrushchev endorsed De Gaulle's view that disarmament should begin with both a cessation of nuclear tests and an agreement to convert stocks of nuclear weapons to peaceful uses. The Soviet delegate in Geneva used the communiqué's reference to a joint desire for the disarmament talks to achieve "definite agreed points of view" on complete and general disarmament in pressing the West to take up specific measures in the Soviet plan.

Khrushchev expressed approval of De Gaulle's policy on Algeria, but he denied the French President's assertion that the Communists were attempting to interfere in the African continent. De Gaulle apparently did not press for a statement on Algeria in the communiqué. De Gaulle also raised his proposal for joint East-West aid to underdeveloped countries and the subject of noninterference in internal

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affairs of other countries, but Khrushchev, as he had done publicly, avoided any direct stand. Apparently in response to De Gaulle's previous statements on Sino-Soviet differences, Khrushchev made a "considerable point" of Moscow's continuing good relations with Peiping, but did not urge recognition of China by France.

The communiqué's reference to a mutual interest in reinforcing European security may provide Khrushchev with an opening to raise this issue at the summit. In his television address in Paris, Khrushchev specifically included European security in a list of the most important international questions, along with disarmament, a German treaty and Berlin, and nuclear testing.

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Khrushchev insinuated in his TV speech that agreement had in fact been reached along this line by noting an "identity of views on certain matters connected with the consolidation of security in Europe."

Discussions on trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, and peaceful uses of atomic energy were included at Khrushchev's insistence in order to demonstrate that the talks covered a wide range of subjects. The USSR pressed for negotiations for a five-year trade agreement but settled for new talks on terms for

1963-65. Although the atomic energy agreement is similar to a US-Soviet agreement, Khrushchev protrayed it as the first such accord with a "nonsocialist" country.

Khrushchev's public statements during the final phase of
his visit and his speech in Moscow provided further evidence
that the immediate objective
for his trip was to maintain a
favorable pre-summit atmosphere
and to project an image of Soviet reasonableness and flexibility in meeting Western views
on key international problems.

As to the summit meeting, he said at a Soviet Embassy reception, "Naturally, it is impossible to settle all outstanding problems in one meeting." In his TV address he held out the possibility of achieving progress "if statesmen take account of mutual interests" and meet each other half way. His treatment of the possibility of a separate peace treaty with East Germany was intended to convey an impression of extreme reluctance to take such action.

From the outset of his visit, however, it was obvious that Khrushchev hoped to generate popular pressure in France for some accommodation to the Soviet position on Germany by arousing old antagonisms and sowing the seeds of suspicion of De Gaulle's ally in Bonn. He sought to create doubts about Germany's reliability by recalling the Hitler-Stalin pact and explaining that diplomacy is a "tricky game" in which the participants must understand that others can play the "same tricks on them."

He warned French parliament members that "West Germany

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might play the same kind of trick Hitler Germany played before World War II." He found it "a point to ponder" that, although Adenauer attacked the USSR in his speeches, Soviet trade with Bonn was growing--"I would ask our French friends to put that under their hat."

French Reaction


the degree of Khrushchev's success in generating popular fears over Germany is not yet clear, but that such fears are obviously latent among certain elements and already present among anti-German extremists such as Daladier, who thanked Khrushchev for reminding the French people of the German menace.

believed Khrushchev had badly misjudged French feelings about Germany and that his remarks had had little if any effect on French public opinion.

Khrushchev's general circumspection and dignity and his stress on peace and Soviet-French friendship might overcome any hesitancy in the average citizen against reaching agreements with the USSR because of ideological differthe French ences. Communist party's role in organizing mass receptions for Khrushchev might hurt the party, but estimated that non-Communist cooperation with the Communists on domestic issues would vary with the extent of the East-West detente.

The French Government took the unusual step of justifying the Khrushchev visit to the public in a nationwide radio-tele-

vision dialogue between Premier Debré and Information Minister Terrenoire. Debré said that Khrushchev's television appearance was required "by the laws of hospitality," denied that the communique was "of meager substance," and took special pains to explain that the Khrushchev visit was a necessary prelude to the summit. Debré also used the opportunity to state that France had few illusions about the practical results of a summit meeting, that France wants "absolute priority" on disarmament, and that an East-West detente could not be based on abandonment of the Western position on Germany and Berlin.



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